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
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by

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Commander, USCG

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Aviation Doctrine and the US Coast Guard

Disclaimer	ii
Abstract.....	iii
Biographical Sketch	iv
Introduction.....	2
What is Doctrine?	3
A Look Back.....	5
Doctrine: Not Just for Warfighters.....	6
No Doctrine -- No Unity of Purpose.....	8
Building Doctrine	10
What Aviation Doctrine Will Do for the Coast Guard.....	13
Indoctrination	17
Summary	19

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ABSTRACT

Title: *Aviation Doctrine and the US Coast Guard*

Author: Thomas J. Allard, Commander, USCG

The purpose of this paper is to inform Coast Guard personnel of the need for service doctrine, specifically aviation doctrine. Some basic concepts and definitions concerning doctrine are discussed. Doctrine helps focus ideas and values; it is not unique to warfighting organizations. The Coast Guard has informal doctrine but needs to codify its doctrinal beliefs. The lack of formally defined ideology robs the Coast Guard of the potential to use aviation at its fullest to enhance mission execution and fulfillment. Doctrine will help the service operate more efficiently by aiding the Coast Guard define what it does and how it should be done.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Commander Thomas J. Allard is a 1973 graduate of the US Coast Guard Academy. He served as a deck watch officer aboard a Coast Guard Cutter before attending US Navy Pilot and Navigator Training in Pensacola, Florida and Corpus Christi, Texas. During his career as a Coast Guard aviator he has flown many types of Coast Guard aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary wing. He has earned FAA ATP (airline transport rating) ratings in both fixed wing and rotorcraft; and holds a masters degree in management from Webster College. Commander Allard is a 1993 graduate of the Air War College.

Introduction

To many in the Coast Guard, the word *doctrine* implies something uniquely military and DoD (Department of Defense) oriented, something destined for the other services to hammer out, play with, and define. The Army, Marine Corps and Air Force have had established formal doctrine for many years. Doctrine is so fundamental and important that these services have their own doctrine centers – places where doctrine is written.

Until recently the Navy has not formally espoused its doctrine. Now the Navy has climbed aboard the doctrine band wagon and established its own doctrine center. The Navy's *From the Sea* provides the foundation upon which new Navy doctrine will be built. The embrace of formal, written doctrine by the Navy will no doubt splash over into the Coast Guard, prompting us to formally codify our beliefs and affairs. The purpose of this paper is to make Coast Guard personnel aware of the need for our own service doctrine, with focus on aviation doctrine. The issues I will raise and questions I propose to answer in this paper are: What is doctrine? How is doctrine made? Why does the Coast Guard need doctrine, specifically aviation doctrine? And what will doctrine do for the Coast Guard?

Hopefully this paper will stimulate Coast Guard mission commanders to ask, "What is the best way aviation can be used to support Coast Guard missions?" Other services have established doctrine for the use of their aviation assets. Now it is our turn.

What is Doctrine?

Doctrine is an important subject that is often poorly understood. It is a perplexing subject; but with a little thought and training, it is easy to comprehend, yet still remains difficult to codify. So what is doctrine? There are several definitions. No one definition is wholly satisfactory, but taken as a group they may well serve to inspire and educate the reader. Doctrine is:

- What we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs.¹
- Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.²
- The central beliefs for waging war in order to achieve victory; the building material for strategy.³
- Beliefs or teachings that have been reasoned from principles, intended as general guides to acceptance of mutually accepted principles and thus to furnish a practical basis for coordination under the extreme difficult conditions governing contact between hostile forces.⁴

¹Drew, Dennis M. and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy, An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB AL, August 1998, pp. 163-174.

²Joint Pub 1-02.

³Gen Curtis E. LeMay.

⁴Edward Scott Johnston.

- That mode of approach that repeated experience has shown usually works best.⁵
- A tool that provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and unity of effort⁶
- (Joint military doctrine presents) the fundamental principles guiding the employment of military power to achieve strategic ends. It bears directly on how leaders think about and prepare for war and is a consolidated "playbook" for the joint warfighting team.⁷

Many of these and other definitions of doctrine include such words as *fight, enemy, combat, military or warfare*. These definitions imply that doctrine is strictly a military device. This is not so. Organizations, civil, ecclesiastical and military, must have basic operating beliefs or doctrine. T. Watson, former leader of IBM said it best, "Any organization, in order to survive and achieve success must have a sound set of beliefs on which it premises all its policies and actions"⁸

Doctrine helps to focus ideas and values. Whether formal or informal, the basics of doctrine can be found in an organization's sayings and slogans. These sayings often describe the elementary beliefs about the way

⁵MGen I. B. Holley, Jr.

⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, Joint Pub 1, Washington 1991, p.5.

⁷Defense 92, p. 31.

⁸Peters, Thomas J. and Robert H. Waterman, Jr. *In Search of Excellence*. Washington, Warner Books, 1982, p.281.

an organization goes about its business. An example of informal Coast Guard doctrine was the age-old saying, "You have to go out, but you don't have to come back." That saying or belief implied Coast Guardsmen would go to any extreme to save others, even sacrificing their own lives. It demonstrated the great degree of pride that we in the Coast Guard have had about our mission as rescuers. It implies that to attempt a rescue in any situation was expected. We had to try at all costs, even if the cost was ones own life. It served as a pillar of our service and provided a sense of comfort when we did lose lives of comrades during rescue missions.

Not too long ago, this saying fell out of vogue and was modified to: "If you go out, you must come back." This new mode of operation implied that we must be better prepared for the perils of the situation and nothing, repeat nothing, is more important than having the rescuer return. This demonstrated a fundamental shift in the way we thought about doing our mission. It was a shift in doctrinal belief.

Both sayings demonstrated the importance of a basic belief in order to accomplish a certain mission. Changing from one concept or belief to another requires a shift in the way one operates. It is beliefs such as these that provide the basic building blocks of doctrine.

A Look Back

Today, as in the past, Coast Guard aviation functions primarily to extend the eyes of mission commanders. Whether the mission area is maritime safety, law enforcement or environmental protection, aviation functions as a force multiplier primarily extending the range of surface assets. In the early years, air advocates professed the belief that aviation would provide a tremendous boost in the area of observation. The early applica-

tion of airpower was to that end. An offshoot to observation was search. Using aviation for maritime search and rescue was conceived in 1915 when Coast Guard Captain Benjamin Chiswell and his two lieutenants, Elmer Stone and Norman Hall, envisioned the notion of using aircraft for Coast Guard mission support. As a result of their perseverance, the Coast Guard in 1916 ordered LT Elmer Stone and five other officers to attend aviation pilot training in Pensacola. Four years later Congress appropriated \$152,000 for the Coast Guard to purchase five aircraft to combat the smuggling of whiskey into the US.⁹ Thus began the Coast Guard's first official use of Coast Guard aviation: provide support for maritime law enforcement. Today Coast Guard aviation assets are dispatched for the same reason they were 70 years ago — to search and locate by air. The targets may be different, the aircraft faster and the crews better trained, but the reasons and methods for employing CG aviation assets remain the same, or do they?

Doctrine: Not Just for Warfighters

Simple logic might suggest that having no combat mission eliminates the need for doctrine. The Coast Guard is an armed force by law, yet our wartime role clearly can be defined simply as providing some type of maritime support to the other services.¹⁰ Outside of minute logistical support, maritime patrol and possibly non-threatening combat SAR (search

⁹Scheina, Robert L., *A History of Coast Guard Aviation*. USCG Commandant's Bulletin 21-86, October 10, 1986. Washington DC, pp. 10-14.

¹⁰Historically the Coast Guard has been involved in combat in many US wars up to and including Vietnam. In those instances the Coast Guard provided personnel and equipment in combat roles, serving primarily to augment and supplement DoD forces. I surmise the Coast Guard's function in future wars will strictly be limited to the area of non combat support. The recent Gulf War demonstrated the need for such support.

and rescue), Coast Guard aviation does not have a wartime task. The Coast Guard's maritime support role during our nation's wars is important to us as an armed force; our warfighting skills however do not put the proverbial bread on our table. The real question is this: does Coast Guard aviation need doctrine for its day-to-day, peacetime missions, maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, environmental protection and national security? I say yes. It does need doctrine.

The Coast Guard's four main missions are maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, environmental protection and national security. These missions mandate the Coast Guard to:

- Remain constantly ready to defend the US, ensure national security and protect national interests.
- Minimize loss of life and property, personal injury and property damage at sea and in US waters.
- Enforce US laws and international agreements of the US
- Ensure the safety and security of marine transportation, ports, waterways and shore facilities.
- Promote marine transportation and other waterborne activity in support of national economic, scientific, defense and social needs.
- Protect the marine environment and its wildlife.
- Ensure effective US presence in polar regions.
- Project the interests of the US in relationships with other maritime nations around the world.
- Assist other agencies in performance of their duties and cooperate in joint maritime ventures.
- Provided an effective maritime communications system.
- When directed by the President, operate as a service in the Navy.

An organization does not have to have a combat mission in order to justify and mandate doctrine. It is the peacetime roles of the Coast Guard coupled with the ability to perform and serve as an armed force that makes the Coast Guard unique. Therefore I submit that we must use doctrine to provide the basis for common

beliefs on how to use our limited and expensive assets effectively and efficiently.

No Doctrine -- No Unity of Purpose

Doctrine drives other issues such as policy, roles, missions, organizational structure, systems acquisition and development. In some regard, the Coast Guard does not have an accepted ideology on the capabilities and uses of its aviation resources. This lack of formally defined beliefs or doctrine robs the Coast Guard of the potential to use aviation at its fullest to enhance mission execution and fulfillment. The results are aviation resources improperly deployed and employed. During times of increased demand this deficiency magnifies the problems of using aviation assets efficiently and effectively.

Change demands new ideas, new assumptions, new approaches, but only doctrine can channel them into a comprehensive way of thinking -- and fighting [and working.]¹¹

So often we are forced to re-think and re-invent procedures. When a successful method to accomplish a task or mission is discovered it seldom gets documented. We in the Coast Guard have been *indoctrinated* into believing the Coast Guard is unique in what it does. As a result of this belief, we tend to measure success on our ability to perform tasks and missions in an ad hoc way. This attitude maintains that a problem and likewise the method of employment used to solve that problem is so singular and unique that no one will ever have to address it again. This is a dogmatic belief that has persisted throughout our service. It is part of our Coast Guard culture. Although this may be an excellent way to

¹¹Schmidt, Stephen D. "A Call for an Official Navy Doctrine," *Naval War College Review*, Winter 1993. p.45. I have added the word working. The original quotation was: ...comprehensive way of thinking -- and fighting.

promote individual ingenuity and accomplishment, it tends to detract from the service's vast experience base. Without doctrine the consistent sharing of information and experiences from person to person, unit to unit and district to district does not occur. Doctrine is the vehicle to ensure that the information is passed on, correctly and uniformly.

As stated earlier, doctrine provides a basic belief about the best way to do things and as a result, doctrine should have a very important impact on the strategy process. Doctrine is useful to calculate and reason how we will employ new resources before we purchase them. Doctrine serves to standardize terminology, relationships, responsibilities and processes in order to free the commander and his staff to focus their efforts on solving the specific problems confronting them.¹²

The Commandant's Strategic Agenda is an excellent document explaining where the Coast Guard will focus its efforts.¹³ Every organization needs such a guide. The agenda was written with an exceptional experience base and includes in-depth analysis and interpretation of our history. Even though we have no codified doctrine, *what we believe will work and what we know will work* has an extraordinary impact on the strategy process. There is a very important link to doctrine and strategic planning. Col Dennis Drew describes this link.

Without doctrine strategists have to make decisions without points of references or without guidance. They would continually be faced with the prospects of reinventing the wheel and repeating past mistakes. Superior doctrine should be the storehouse of analyzed experience and military wisdom and should be the fundamental guide in decision making.¹⁴

¹² US Marine Corps FMFM 1-2, 1991, p. 1-2.

¹³USCG Commandant Instruction 16000.21, 21 Sep 1990.


¹⁴Drew, p. 172.

Building Doctrine

The Coast Guard has doctrine but has not taken the time and effort to codify it. Unknowingly we use doctrine often. We carry it around in our heads using it from time to time. The problem with this method of using doctrine is that each user has his or her own version, and therein lies the rub.

A process for developing doctrine is shown below.¹⁵ The model is simple and demonstrates the steps or phases one should follow. The process begins with an organization's history. In the Coast Guard this would be unit records, logs, case histories, personal experiences, operational theories, and so on. This is the cornerstone of doctrine and begins the development process. It is the collection of what works and what doesn't work. One excellent source of doctrine is the documented interviews of Coast Guard people, both on active duty and retired. People who have played a role in the development of our operational procedures. People who have designed and purchased equipment. People who have had noteworthy experiences. There are sources of information outside the Coast Guard as well. For example in the development of SAR doctrine, interviews of these people rescued would be an exceptional source of material. The Air Force has an extensive collection of interviews from W.W.II veterans describing their personal experiences and serves as a large part of the historic foundation of air power doctrine.

¹⁵The Doctrine Development Process Model was obtained by the author in an interview with Professor Dennis Drew, Assistant Dean, USAF School for Advanced Airpower Studies, 22 March 1993.



Gathering, collecting, researching, and consolidating all of this information is the next step in the chain. Then, next comes the analysis. What went wrong? What went right? Was there a better way? These are a few of the questions that can be used to focus this stage of the development process. Looking or analyzing information naturally leads to a development phase. To put it simply we now ask, "Based on what I know so far, what should I do?" These ideas are aired, often in the form of intra-service articles. Current operational practices are compared and discussed. *Flight Lines*, the Coast Guard's quarterly publication, is one such vehicle to accomplish this phase. The concepts and basics of doctrine are not conjured up in smoke filled rooms, but are shared, debated and discussed by everyone in the organization.

The actual writing of formal doctrine is left to a small dedicated group within the organization. The published doctrine is endorsed by top management and now serves as a pillar to educate or rather indoctrinate the organization's members. Key to this entire doctrine development process is the education phase. The best doctrine in the universe will do no good unless *indoctrination* takes place. The theories put forth by doctrine must be absorbed by the organization. Education or indoctrination must take place at an early point in one's career and continue throughout the years of one's service.

Once indoctrinated service men and women apply doctrine as they perform their duties. The development process continues with the application of doctrine. The more one's doctrine is applied, the more it becomes engrained in the organization's work force thereby contributing to each phase of the development process.

The Air Force, Army and Marine Corps all have their own version of doctrine. The US Marine Corps manuals FMFM 1 and FMFM 1-1 are examples of what doctrine can look like. These two manuals discuss warfighting and campaigning respectively. Although the contents of these manuals have little relevance to Coast Guard operations, they do illustrate how good doctrine is organized and the importance of doctrine to the organization. The foreword in FMFM 1, by then Marine Corps Commandant, General A. M. Gray, succinctly describes the purpose of the doctrine manual. "This book does not contain specific techniques and procedures for conduct. Rather, it provides guidance in the form of concepts and values. It requires judgment in application." He further

writes on the importance of doctrine. "I expect every officer to read – and reread – this book, understand it, and take its message to heart."¹⁶

The Air Force's, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, is published in two volumes. Volume I is a 20 page "bare bones" of Air Force doctrine in quick reference form. Volume II contains over 300 pages of essays that provide the evidence and supporting rational for each doctrinal statement contained in Volume I.¹⁷

The Marine Corps and Air Force doctrine manuals reveal there is no one way to write doctrine; nevertheless they clearly demonstrate the importance these services have placed on constructing and codifying their basic service doctrine.

What Aviation Doctrine Will Do for the Coast Guard

Past experience is a foundation and source for doctrine, especially those experiences that have been successful.¹⁸ Past experience is not something to use completely to plan and predict the future; nevertheless it can be useful. Within our service we have many sources we can use to formulate aviation doctrine. The Air Operations Manual, the National Search and Rescue Manual,¹⁹ past aviation newsletter articles and a host of area and district OPLANS and instructions are examples of sources. Each provides a common thread or umbrella to define what we believe. The disadvantage of not having aviation doctrine is that there is no historical codification of

¹⁶US Marine Corps FMFM 1, Washington DC 1989, Foreword.

¹⁷Air Force Manual 1-1, *Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force*, Washington DC, March 1992, p. v.

¹⁸Drew, p. 164

¹⁹The National Search and Rescue Manual, Volumes I and II, dated 1 Feb. 91, have been designed joint doctrine publications number 3-50 and 3-50.1 respectively. The Coast Guard has coordinating responsibility for the promulgation of both publications.

beliefs. We are often forced to reinvent the wheel, and as a result mission performance varies from unit to unit. Drawing from my personal experiences I will give some examples where the lack of aviation doctrine has hurt performance.

For years Coast Guard aircraft have conducted POLPATs or pollution patrols over our nation's harbors, rivers, bays, coastlines and offshore territorial waters. Numerous hours of flight time were devoted to this mission to locate pollution and attempt to locate its source. My experience with these missions spans many years and includes many different aircraft types. Not once during these years did I receive any formal training or instruction on how I was to perform the mission. As a young pilot I learned how to execute this mission by talking with and observing seasoned "POLPAT" pilots. It was simple, get in a helicopter or airplane and fly around looking for pollution. In theory it sounded and looked good – patrol for pollution; but that is about as far as it went. Looking back there were no published guidelines on how to do the

Coast Guard aircraft operate from air stations located along the US coastlines, Puerto Rico, Alaska and Hawaii. There are over 200 aircraft in the Coast Guard inventory, making this service the seventh largest naval air force in the world. Coast Guard aircrews perform a variety of missions aboard the service's eight aircraft, including electronic air detection of illegal drug smuggling by either air or sea, search and rescue, law enforcement operations and environmental response.

Fixed Wing Aircraft

- **HC-130:** Long range search and logistics, 30 aircraft.
- **EC-130:** Airborne surveillance, 1 aircraft.
- **HU-25:** Medium range search and air interdiction, 40 aircraft.
- **RG-8:** Airborne reconnaissance, 2 aircraft.

Helicopters

- **HH-3:** Medium range recovery, leaving the inventory in 1994.
- **HH-65:** Short range recovery, 96 aircraft.
- **HH-60:** Medium range recovery, 35 aircraft.

mission, how to use the aviation assets, and what affect we were having on the polluters. I don't mean to imply that the mission of POLPATs was not valid, I am sure it was and still is. The questions are: What is the proper way to conduct such a mission? Where should the assets look, and what should the assets look for? We tend to take aviation, this expensive resource, for granted, not admitting its limitations and at times not developing its full potential. Doctrine on the use and employment of aircraft for pollution patrols will address this issue. Not only will this benefit the air crews, but also will serve to inform the operational commanders, the Marine Safety Office personnel and Group watchstanders of the capabilities and limitations of using aviation assets for the mission. Doctrine will force us to work more effectively and efficiently.

Another example that illustrates the need for aviation doctrine involves the use of night vision goggles (NVGs). These devices have been in use by Coast Guard pilots for the past eight years or so. The initial introduction of NVGs prompted some concerns and objections. Once pilots used NVGs and gained some experience, mission enhancement quickly overshadowed any objections.

Policy statements were issued concerning NVGs: when could they be worn, the minimum altitudes at which NVGs could be used, what the cockpit and pilot limitations were, how many training flight hours per month were required, and so forth. Not one document, that I am aware of, was published describing how these devices were to be used to find some-

thing, and how SAR mission coordinators²⁰ could or should plan searches when NVGs were available. After word and experience spread, NVGs became an accepted and necessary aid for night searches; but still there is no doctrine on their use.

The use of NVGs is only part of the issue. Historically a Coast Guard aircraft callout for a night search usually resulted in one immediate sortie with a follow on 'first light' search. This is the way we have been 'indoctrinated' on how to prosecute SAR. With NVG technology it is quite possible that the best way to find a target is to continue searching at night and not wait for daylight. This will require a major shift in the way we conduct searches. Aviation doctrine would address this problem. This doctrine would be not just for those in aviation, but for anyone involved with the SAR mission.

Earlier I stated there was a link between doctrine and strategy and that doctrine may be used to determine how we will employ new resources before we purchase them. An example where this did not happen was during the purchase of the HU25C air interceptor.²¹ The decision was made to equip these aircraft with a NVG compatible cockpit. This required a special lighting system for every gage and dial in the cockpit. This aircraft modification was expensive and proved costly to maintain. The system worked well in that NVGs could be used from the cockpit, but the need to use the NVGs from the cockpit never materialized. Several years after the cockpits were modified the requirement for an NVG HU25C

²⁰The SMC, or SAR mission coordinator, is the unit controlling the search and rescue case. The SMC may be a Coast Guard air station, Group office, or District operations center.

²¹In the mid 1980s, the Coast Guard modified 9 HU25A aircraft with an air intercept radar (APG-66) and FLIR (forward looking infra red). The mission for these aircraft was airborne drug interdiction in the Caribbean basin.

cockpit was dropped. I do not intend to fault those who purchased the NVG system. I use this example to show that had proper doctrine for this mission been written or even discussed, an expensive mistake may have been avoided.

Indoctrination

As mentioned earlier, education or indoctrination, is essential to the doctrine development process. The importance of professional military education (PME) is acknowledged and proclaimed by the DoD services. It is essential to the development, promotion, and application of their doctrine.

The training of pilots and aircrews in the Coast Guard has met great success over the years. Excellent facilities at the Aviation Training Center (ATC) in Mobile and the Aviation Training and Technical Center (ATTC) in Elizabeth City attest to the commitment the Coast Guard has to provide the best training. Standardization among pilots and aircrews is the hallmark of the Coast Guard's aviation training program. Many things have been tried over the years to reach the level of training we now enjoy. Annual standardization visits to each air station and yearly pilot proficiency courses and instrument checks in the flight simulator attest to a belief that this type of training works.

Standardization is not to be confused as doctrine. Standardization falls more in the line of regulation and policy. Aviation standardization has conveyed proven methods of operating our aircraft. It is our current method of aviation doctrine education. It is tradition. We pass along the proven and accepted techniques of operating our aircraft. I do not mean to imply that instructing flying skills is doctrine education. I refer to the

teaching of employing systems during the training process, the things that are not found in an aircraft flight manual, such as how to do a search with NVGs, how to drop a dewatering pump to a vessel, how to search for a specific target given certain weather conditions, how to configure and aircraft for a non-SAR mission, etc. Along with this indoctrination come the personal experiences of the instructors, what worked and what did not. The major problem with this method of doctrine education is that it is not well documented and stays mostly within the aviation community. Sometimes proven or better methods of using aviation resources do not reach the mission commanders who use aviation for support.

A doctrine center, like our larger sister services have, would be one way and probably the best way to develop and promote doctrine. For aviation doctrine, ATC Mobile would be an excellent place for such a center. The training functions at ATC go hand-in-hand with the development, education, promotion, and application of doctrine.

The majority of all Coast Guard pilots receive training early on and throughout their career at ATC Mobile.²² When compared to DoD, training class sizes are extremely small, usually 4 pilots. This small class size lends itself well to spreading aviation doctrine through observation and discussion. As I stated before, this is how we pass on aviation doctrine. We need a formal method of doctrine education. Furthermore aviation doctrine education should not be limited to just aviators, it must include everyone in the Coast Guard.

²²Designated Coast Guard pilots receive transition training in one of five aircraft HC130, HU25, HH3, HH65 and HH60. All pilot transition training is done at ATC Mobile with the exception of HC130 training that is done by the USAF.

The National SAR School course is an example of doctrine education. Although the instruction at this school deals with a specific topic and much more in depth than required for doctrine education, it does provide *all* Coast Guardsmen with a common language to conduct SAR. I submit that this is the reason we do search and rescue so well. Everyone in the Coast Guard is indoctrinated on this mission area. Whether we realize it or not, we all have received basic doctrine training on the proper way to conduct searches. We were taught the best way to combine and coordinate air and surface assets. Over 40 years ago, a fellow officer mentioned how Coast Guardsmen are brought up on the tradition of SAR.

I recognize that every Coast Guard officer has been reared in the traditions of saving lives. Early in our service careers we had equal understanding and knowledge about this field. However, as our careers progressed our experiences in many instances, have taken different paths. There are many of us who have been continuously and closely identified with search and rescue. The rest have, to varying degrees, channeled their energies into other fields of endeavor.²³

We must now take what we have done with SAR doctrine and expand it into other missions. Doctrine must encompass all mission areas not just SAR, and it must be taught to all in our service.

Summary

I briefly discussed the need for aviation doctrine and the benefits of such doctrine. There are other areas of the Coast Guard that would also

²³Scheibel, W. B. CAPT USCG, *Status of Search and Rescue*, Speech delivered to officers at Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington DC, 9 Feb 1951. (The text of this speech was discovered by the author in the US Air Force Historical Research Agency.)

benefit from doctrine. Such a mission area in need of doctrine is the Coast Guard's national security warfighting role. CAPT Bruce Stubbs makes a pitch for Coast Guard warfighting doctrine in his report *The US Coast Guard's National Security Role in the Twenty-First Century*. Will the Coast Guard be asked to play a part in the next regional conflict or war, or will the Coast Guard have to ask to be part of the action? Without doctrine the warfighting role of the Coast Guard will be ad hoc. Some of us in the Coast Guard might have a good idea what we will be tasked to do during the next war, but how do we let the CinCs and our national policy and decision makers know what the Coast Guard can bring to the fight? Force planning, training, and equipping are shaped by well-defined policies and doctrine on particular roles and missions.²⁴ It is up to us to inform our nation's leaders and especially our DoD counterparts what the Coast Guard can do. Doctrine provides such a vehicle.

Doctrine will not only will help others learn about our wartime capabilities, but also help our own forces train and prepare for both wartime and our day to day peacetime missions. Taking the time and effort to develop doctrine will not be easy, but it will make us operate more effectively and efficiently and in doing so help us define what we do and how we should do it.

²⁴Stubbs, Bruce B. *The US Coast Guard's National Security Role in the 21st Century*, US Naval War College, Jun. 1992. p. 180.